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Steven Ratuva 's View |
The politics of preferences: Who will win?
Mon May 01, 2006 8:24 pm
The popular political myth is that democratic elections are won and lost on the basis of people’s direct choices.
What we forget is that people’s choices have to go through the complex mechanics of the electoral process, endorsed by some ambitious politicians and drafted by some overpaid lawyers, which become the
vehicle through which our democratic choices are legitimized.
Our Alternative Voting (AV) system is a complex one which many are still trying to come to terms with.
Let me take this opportunity to explain what it is and the implications of the preferences on the results of the coming election.
First Past the Post (FPP) and Alternative Voting System (AV)
The first past the post (FPP) system which Fiji used under the 1970 Constitution was very straight forward. All you need is someone, out of the total number of candidates to collect a simple majority vote to win.
For instance if there are four candidates with the following distribution of votes: A- 20%. B-40%; C-30% and D-10%, B becomes the winner by virtue of the largest share of the votes.
Full stop!
While the mechanics of voting and counting is simple and straightforward, there are deeper political, ideological and ethical questions raised about its legitimacy.
For instance, does D with 40% of the vote represent the interest of
the majority of the voters? In cases where up to 20 candidates stand, the winner may poll only 10% or less of the votes.
In line with the values of democratic representativeness, someone elected through a small minority may not have the full “mandate” of the people.
A possible solution for this problem is to “democratize” the process a bit more by using another system of voting which ensures that the winner polls more than half (at least 51%) of the total vote. The 51% is achieved through a preferential system.
There are two types of preferences built into the AV electoral system.
The first is political party preference where each party provides preferences in terms of priority to other political parties. On the ballot paper, the voter votes “above the line” by ticking the box besides the party name and symbol and in the process, at least theoretically, “gives” the party the power to decide what to do with the vote, whether the voter likes it or not.
The above the line vote and the associated party preference has been criticized for being too undemocratic as it gives political parties too much power and undermines the individual voter’s choices.
The second type of preference is on the basis of individual voter’s choice which allows voters to number the candidates in order of their preferences starting with Number 1 (highest preference).
This takes place “below the line.” However, compared to the “above the line” vote, the voters have direct choice as to which particular candidate and thus political party they prefer.
During the counting, if a party does not receive the desired 51% after the first count, counting proceeds to the second round with the party with the least number of votes being eliminated and its second preference passed on to the party to whom it had given its second preference.
The process of elimination continues until a party wins the 51% number of votes.
So preferences do matter in terms of determining the eventual winners and that’s why political parties are often anxious to acquire the second preference of other political parties (usually a party’s first preference goes to the party itself).
During the 2001 election 28 or 40% of the total number of seats were
won on the basis of preferences.
This is very significant indeed.
The National Federation Party (NFP) preferences controversy
The allocation of preferences has become a very sophisticated and complex political game and the NFP has demonstrated how this can be cleverly used to one’s advantages.
It has given all its Fijian Communal seat second preferences
to SDL and all its Indian Communal second preferences to Labour.
For Labour and SDL these communal seats preferences are of questionable use because they were going to win most of these seats anyway.
NFP’s preferences merely reinforce the status quo. Both Labour and SDL saw this as deceptive tokenism and were not impressed at all.
If NFP was serious about winning an Indian communal seat, it should have given its second preference to a strong independent candidate.
This is because in constituencies where there is split in votes by independents and SDL (which has a number of Indo-Fijian candidates), and where there are no clear winners, Labour and NFP would most probably proceed to the next round of counting and this is where NFP needs someone else’s second preference to win.
Perhaps the most significant seats where preferences are clearly decisive are the Open seats.
This is because the constituencies are multi-racial and the
political parties (which are by and large ethnic based) are competing not only to win the votes of their own ethnic communities, also of other communities.
Some Open seats are marginal (especially the six in the Suva-Nausori corridor),that is, the results can swing either way, depending on the ethno-demographic makeup (generally people still vote along ethnic lines) and the trend of voting.
These are seats where preferences are most decisive in swinging the
votes.
For the Open seats, NFP has given SDL preference for 9 seats most of which it won the last time and 11 for Labour, again, most of which it won the last time.
NFP also allocated preferences for 3 Open seats on the basis of gender.
Thus preferences for three marginal seats (and which SDL) won in 2001 through NFP preferences were taken away from SDL.
SDL was banking this time on the NFP preference in the Tamavua/Samabula Open (which has now gone to Labour) to ensure Dr Tupeni Baba’s return to Cabinet, possibly as Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
Another seat SDL is worried about losing is the Naitasiri/Nausori
Open.
In the mind of the NFP, by giving SDL all its preferences as in 2001 may lead to a big majority which would undermine democratic debate and also if SDL gets a big majority it might not need NFP’s support, although SDL has made a commitment for an NFP-SDL coalition.
Another NFP logic is that to increase its attractiveness and indispensability as a possible coalition partner after the
election, it should ensure that Labour and SDL win by just modest number of seats.
NFP hopes that it would be the sought after gem.
However, while NFP did everything right for itself, it provoked the wrath of the other political parties.
Labour accused NFP of sabotage, SDL accused it of betrayal and the National Alliance accused it of insulting chiefs.
Below the political rhetoric are more worrying signs, especially coming from the SDL which saw NFP’s behavior as “typical” of Indo-Fijian “liumuri” (backstabbing).
Ethnic stereotypes have been invoked to explain what was purely a tactical move by NFP.
Worse still is the use of the term “i valu” (war) by the SDL to refer to the coming election.
This plays well into the macho psyche of Fijian ethno-nationalists.
The SDL has changed its approach from working towards a multi-ethnic government with NFP to a largely nationalist mobilization strategy.
It has called on Fijian voters to rally together to vote for Fijian candidates and win crucial seats in the first count.
NFP’s attempt to be a middle ground arbitrator by tactfully distributing preferences has turned out to be a curse of sorts by reinforcing ethnic electioneering.
However, if NFP wins say 2-3 seats, they would still be in a position to negotiate with any of the two major parties, SDL or Labour and it
would have to make a choice which is in line with its “moderate” position.
Perhaps one way of avoiding this pre-election tension is just to get rid of the above the line voting and just allow voters to list their preferences below the line as they wish.
This option is more democratic because it makes sure that the
individual voter’s intention are considered.
A question which demands a loud and clear answer is, why are the political parties so worried about the NFP preferences? One reason is that there seems to be a recognition that NFP is an emerging strong party which to the SDL can be used to displace Labour and for Labour, it can be used as a tool for ethnic solidarity by displacing SDL.
Some would argue that NFP has the potential to win a few Indian Communal seats thus slowly relegating Labour as the mainstream
Indo-Fijian party.
However, lest we forget the preferences by the independents are also crucial, especially in marginal seats. Because a lot of them are giving each other preferences, we are bound to see some surprises in the form of victory by independent candidates.
Thus what we might see in this election are NFP, other minority parties such as PANU and independents winning seats and forcing SDL and Labour to horse trade much harder, providing concessions in the form of ministerial positions.
In the absence of the full preferential list, it is not possible at this stage to make predictions but this will certainly be made in the near future.
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